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Analyzing Management Fees of Pension Funds: A 
Case Study of Mexico 
Tapen Sinha* 
Abstractt 
Though the rates of return for public pension funds have been high over 
the past two decades, one critical aspect of the financing of this type of fund 
is often overlooked: high management fees. As a result, the rates of return 
for workers who have invested in these funds have not necessarily been high. 
Management fees charged on pension funds in Mexico result in a leakage of 
funds in the order of 20-30% of the fund. That is, the amount at retirement 
would have been 20-30% higher had there been no fees. 
A model is developed that includes all the diverse fees and discounts. No 
other model of the Mexican system contains all of these fees and discounts. 
Therefore, simulations from other studies do not yield reliable results. Our 
simulation results show that it is rarely optimal (from the point of view of 
minimizing lifetime management fees) to stay with one company. Also, no 
company dominates all others with respect to the minimization of its fees. 
Unfortunately, because of the complexity of the fee structure, it is difficult to 
say much beyond this. This research shows that the risks that the privatized 
system carries may be much higher than what appears at first sight. 
Key words and phrases: privatization, defined contribution plan, Chile, retire-
ment fund, pay-as-you-go, AFORE, simulation 
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1 Introduction 
Privatization of pensions has become an important issue around the 
world. From Chile to China, from Argentina to Zimbabwe, privatiza-
tion of pensions either has been implemented or is being contemplated 
(Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt, 1999). 
Nowhere in the world has privatization of state-run pension schemes 
been undertaken with more zeal than in Latin America. Ten countries 
in the world have privatized their pension plans (Social Security Ad-
ministration, 1999)-eight of them are from Latin America (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, EI Salvador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay). The 
other two are from Eastern Europe (Hungary and Poland). 
In 1997, a new privatized (but government-mandated) system of re-
tirement program was created in Mexico. The system is essentially a 
defined contribution pension plan in which private companies operate 
pension funds. Each company operating a pension fund is called an 
Administradora de Fondos de Retiro or an AFORE. Under the system 
each worker will have his or her own account with an AFORE, and this 
account accumulates the individual and government contributions and 
the investment returns generated by these contributions. Thus, the 
contributions and the performance of the fund solely will determine 
each worker's pension benefit. 
In some sense, the Mexican model can be viewed as an adaptation of 
the Chilean model. The Chilean model is the most decentralized model 
of pension. Chile has succeeded in delivering many benefits for which 
privatized pension plans strive. Most policy makers in Mexico are famil-
iar with the system in Chile and are influenced by it. Economists (such 
as Diamond, 1994, 1999) have criticized the Chilean system because of 
its high transaction cost. In some ways, the high growth rate in real 
wages and high real rates of return have obscured high transactions 
costs for Chile. 
Like the Chilean system, an unfortunate feature of the new Mexican 
system is its relatively high management fees. Management fees im-
posed on the pension funds in Mexico are the most complex in Latin 
America. It is difficult for anyone other than sophisticated investors to 
disentangle the effects of various charges and determine which fund 
offers the best rate of return. There are several types of fees and dis-
counts. These high fees result in severe losses to the development of 
the workers' funds. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of management 
fees on funds available at retirement for Mexican workers. To this end 
a model is developed in which all the diverse fees and discounts are ac-
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counted for. This model is used to calculate future values of the fund, 
taking into account all the complexities of the Mexican system. The 
model is also used to compare funds over various horizons under a va-
riety of scenarios. In all other models developed in the Mexican context, 
many of these cost elements have been ignored. Due to the complexity 
of the management fee structure, analytic results are difficult to obtain; 
simulations are used instead. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some of the 
reasons for moving from a state-run pay-as-you-go system to a priva-
tized system. Section 3 reviews the basics of the new Mexican system 
and comments on some of its deficiencies. 
2 Why Privatize SOCial Security? 
Why are Latin American countries enthused about privatizing social 
security? There are four related reasons: 
• Policy makers have recognized that their current state-run pay-as-
you-go systems will be bankrupt within the next decade or so. 
• The pioneering privatization plan in Chile has been extolled for 
its success. The Chilean example has given privatization a new 
sense of urgency in neighboring countries. 
• Privatization systems seem to increase national saving. 
• Privatization helps develop long-term capital markets. 
2.1 What's Wrong With the Pay-as-You-Go System? 
Developed countries (such as the Unites States) are beginning to ex-
perience problems with pay-as-you-go retirement systems (such as the 
U.S. social security system) largely due to a mismatch of benefits paid 
to retirees compared with the revenue generated from the working pop-
ulation. 
Similar problems are in the offing for other countries. Therefore, 
aging itself provides a strong incentive for fixing the systems in some 
ways. 
These problem can arise in a number of different ways: 
• The government increases the benefits of the retired population 
by indexing benefits to inflation without indexing revenue in the 
same way. 
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• The government relaxes eligibility (for example, by relaxing the 
age of retirement, by making the definition of disability or poor 
health broader etc.). 
• Government, directly or indirectly, reduces its revenue base. For 
example, a rise in the marginal tax rates may force some people 
to leave the formal employment sector (where they finance such a 
scheme through payroll taxes) and enter the informal (cash-only) 
sector where they avoid paying payroll taxes thus reducing the 
government's revenue base. 
• The population is aging, Le., the percentage of the aged in the 
population is increasing. Aging is caused mainly by falling birth 
rates and falling mortality rates at the older ages. 
Table 1 illustrates how the projected proportion of older persons 
will rise (in some cases, dramatically) in Latin American countries. For 
comparison, the United States is included in Table 1. There are two 
striking features of Table 1: 
1. From looking at the column for 2050, all the countries appear to 
be converging to a similar population structure. The proportion 
of people over 60 is similar across countries. If, instead of this 
proportion, we look at the entire distribution (say separated by 
five years), it will be similar too. 
2. Not all countries have the same degree of population aging in 
1990. 
As Argentina and Uruguay have population structures that are similar 
to the United States' population structure today, there is a certain ur-
gency of reform for their state-run pension scheme that exceeds those 
of other Latin American countries. On the other hand, even though 
Peru has a much younger population structure today, its population is 
expected to experience the benefits of better health care and medicines 
and will age rapidly over the next 50 years. A similar experience is 
expected to occur in the other countries in Latin America. 
From the point of view of demographics (Le., population structure), 
the potential problem may seem to be far in the future. But many 
Latin American countries will face the problem sooner rather than later. 
There are many inefficiencies in their public pension systems, including 
a large informal (cash-only) sector, that make the problem more acute 
than ever before (Vittas, 1994). 
Bolivia is a classic example of how things can go wrong, even when 
the population structure is young. Bolivia has had a defined-benefit 
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Table 1 
Projections of Percentage of Population 
Over Age 60 from 1990-2050 
Year 1990 2030 2050 
Argentina l3.1 19.3 25.9 
Bolivia 5.4 10.0 17.6 
Brazil 6.7 16.9 24.2 
Chile 8.7 20.8 26.4 
Colombia 6.0 18.0 25.5 
Ecuador 5.5 l3.7 22.4 
Mexico 5.7 15.7 24.6 
Paraguay 5.2 10.4 16.1 
Peru 5.8 l3.7 21.5 
Uruguay 16.4 22.5 27.8 
Venezuela 5.6 15.5 23.6 
U.S. 16.6 28.2 29.8 
Source: World Bank (1994). 
pay-as-you-go scheme for many years. In 1997 the number of people 
contributing to the system was 300,000. The number of people draw-
ing a pension from the system was 120,000. Thus, the pensioner to 
contributor dependency ratio of the system was 40 (120,000/300,000) 
percent. If we look at the ratio of number persons age 60+ to the num-
ber age less than 60 in the population as a whole, however, it is 5.8 
(l00 x 0.054/ (l - 0.054)) percent (Table 1). The percentage of GDP 
covered by the system was less than 12 percent (von Gersdorff, 1997). 
Most pensioners were either government employees (65 percent of the 
total) or schoolteachers (30 percent). The Bolivian economy, however, 
is dominated by the informal sector. 
2.2 Why is Everyone Looking at Chile? 
The Chilean system has produced spectacular results in terms of 
rates of return on funds (Table 2). The system also has created deeper 
financial markets; markets for long-term bonds have developed as a 
direct consequence of the system. The saving rate in Chile also has 
risen spectacularly over the same period, from 8.2 percent of GDP in 
1982 to 23.3 percent in 1996. Real GDP has increased at an average 
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annual rate of 7.7 percent from 1980 to 1997. [For an illuminating 
discussion on the Chilean system, see Edwards (1996).] GDP growth 
has slowed to 3.1 percent in 1998 and -1.4 percent in 1999. Many 
commentators have jumped to the conclusion that the rise in saving 
and GDP are (partly) consequences of privatization of pension (Pifiera, 
2000). This conclusion, however, is not supported by statistical evi-
dence (Holzmann, 1996). 
Table 2 
Percentage Rates of Return 
For Pension Funds in Chile 
Weighted 
Year Average Range 
1982 28.8 23.2 to 30.2 
1983 21.2 18.5 to 24.7 
1984 3.6 2.2 to 5.1 
1985 13.4 13.0 to 14.3 
1986 12.3 10.6 to 15.5 
1987 5.4 4.8 to 8.5 
1988 6.5 5.9 to 8.7 
1989 6.9 4.0 to 9.5 
1990 15.6 13.3 to 19.4 
1991 29.7 25.8 to 34.3 
1992 3.0 0.9 to 4.2 
1993 16.2 14.6 to 16.9 
1994 18.2 15.7 to 21.1 
1995 -2.5 -4.6 to -1.8 
1996 3.5 2.9 to 4.1 
1997 4.7 -0.2 to 5.5 
1998 -1.1 -2.7 to -0.4 
1999 12.31 11.99 to 14.16 
Source: Banco Central de Chile, Boletin Mensual (various 
issues). Notes: Rates of return (in %) are weighted by the 
asset value in each pension fund. The data for 1999 are 
through August 1999. 
There are several notable features of Table 2. First, the average rates 
of return for funds in Chile have been high. This has impressed many 
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foreign observers; however, there is a large year-to-year variation. At 
the same time, the rates of return for different funds in any particular 
year have not varied a great deal in that year (especially early years). 
The rate of return for funds is misleading, however, as it does not nec-
essarily mean the same thing for the workers who have contributed to 
these funds. This difference is discussed further below. 
2.3 Saving and Capital Market Developments 
In theory, under certain conditions savings may rise as a result ofpri-
vatization. Such results are sensitive to model specification. A change 
in model specification can lead to a collapse of the result (Sinha, 2000, 
Chapter 2). As Chile has the longest experience of privatized pensions, 
it is natural that researchers have turned to Chile to investigate the 
question of whether savings rise under privatization. The Chilean ev-
idence, when carefully analyzed, shows that national saving rate does 
not increase when social security is privatized (Holzmann, 1996, Agosin 
et al., 1997). 
Do capital market developments follow from pension privatization? 
It is clear that privatization needs to be preceded by some capital mar-
ket development. For example, there has to be a well-functioning gov-
ernment bond market (Vittas, 1996). 
3 Mexican System 
3.1 The Pre-Reform System 
Since 1943 Mexico had a system run by the IMSS (Instituto Mexicano 
del Seguro Social). There are four pillars of this system: (i) disability, old 
age, severance, and life insurance; (ii) maternity and health insurance; 
(iii) workplace insurance; and (iv) childcare centers. 
The disability, old age, severance, and life insurance component 
(also known as Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez, Cesancia en Edad Avanzada 
y Muerte abbreviated to IVCM) is the largest program for social security 
in Mexico. IVCM is a pay-as-you-go scheme that has protected workers 
in the formal sector since 1943. In addition, there are separate dis-
ability, old age, severance, and life insurance programs for government 
employees, for the armed forces, and others. 
Total contribution to IVCM was 8.5 percent of base salary in 1996. 
There is a tripartite split between the employers, employees, and the 
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government. Employers paid 5.95 percent, employees paid 2.125 per-
cent, and the government paid 0.425 percent of the base salary. In 
addition, there was an additional payment of 2 percent of base salary 
in the SAR (Sistema para el retiro, the retirement account). 
There were many problems associated with the old IVCM system. 
Only a small percentage of workers was covered. For example, in 1999 
fewer than 30 percent of the workers in the labor force were covered. In 
addition, it is estimated that without any reform, revenue for the IMSS 
in 1999 would have fallen short of the cost in 1999, a classic problem 
of pay-as-you-go schemes. 
3.2 Pension Reform in Mexico 
On July 1, 1997, a new privatized (but government-mandated) re-
tirement system came into existence in Mexico, replacing IVCM. This 
system consists of private companies operating pension funds. Each 
company operating a pension fund is called an Administradora de Fon-
dos de Retiro or an AFORE. The investment fund, run by the company 
independent of the parent AFORE company, is called a Sociedad de In-
version en Fondos de Retiro (a SIEFORE). 
Each worker in the system is assigned a retirement fund account 
with an AFORE. Funds in the account accumulate through periodic em-
ployer, employee, and government contributions and from the yield 
generated by investment in the AFORE. Thus, the contributions and the 
investment performance of the fund alone determine each worker's 
pension benefits at retirement. This individual defined contribution 
pension scheme contrasts sharply with the old pay-as-you-go scheme 
ran by IMSS. 
Among the four pillars mentioned earlier, only IVCM was privatized 
through AFOREs. The other three pillars are still being operated by 
IMSS. We will not consider the other three pillars of the IMSS. [See Banco 
de Mexico (1996) for further discussion on reform in the other three 
pillars.] 
There are two elements of contribution to an account: contribu-
tion of 6.5 percent of wages by the employee/employer and a govern-
ment contribution of 5.5 percent of national minimum salary (regard-
less of the worker's actual salary). For a worker who earns exactly the 
minimum salary, the contribution to an AFORE will be 1l.5 percent 
(6.5 + 5.5) of his or her salary. For a worker earning ten times the min-
imum salary, the contribution will be 7.05 percent (6.5 + 5.5/10) of his 
or her actual salary. For the average worker, the government contri-
bution amounts to 2.2 percent of salary. For high-income workers, the 
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government contribution is a relatively insignificant percentage of their 
salary. 
The new system is compulsory for persons entering the workforce 
on or after July 1, 1997. Individuals who have contributed to the old 
system have a choice: they can opt for the benefits under the old scheme 
or they can receive benefits from the new scheme, whichever is larger. 
The majority that have contributed to the old system for at least 20 
years will fare better under the old scheme. For others, it depends 
critically on the rates of return that the new scheme will earn. Thus, 
there will be additional costs incurred during the transition. The cost 
will rise up to 4 percent of GDP during the early part of the 21 st century 
(Sales-Sarrapy et al., 1996). 
The new system has spawned many AFOREs. Seventeen AFOREs 
have been given licenses to operate (although four since have merged). 
Mexican companies (mainly banks) own some of them (wholly). Others 
have large (although not majority) foreign shareholders. Table 3 lists 
the AFOREs in operation at the end of 2000. 
The Mexican government has created a separate division to over-
see the activities of the AFOREs: the Comision Nacional del Sistema 
de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR). CONSAR has the critical role of 
overseeing all the activities of AFOREs. For example, CONSAR has es-
tablished general rules of operation of the AFOREs. 
The objectives of these institutions include: 
• Open, administer, and manage the individual retirement accounts 
in agreement with provisions in social security laws. Regarding 
housing-promotion sub-accounts, the AFOREs will register each 
worker's contributions, and the interest paid thereon, based on 
information provided by social security institutions. 
• Receive, from social security institutions, the contributions made, 
in accordance with the law, by the government, employers, and 
workers, as well as voluntary contributions by workers and em-
ployers. 
• Itemize the amounts received periodically from social security in-
stitutions and deposit them into each worker's individual retire-
ment account, as with the returns obtained on the investment of 
these funds. 
• Provide administrative services to mutual investment funds. (Banco 
de Mexico, 1996). 
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Table 3 
AFOREs Authorized by CONSAR and Their Compositions 
AFORE Main Shareholders and Percentage Holding 
Atl{mtico Promex Banca Promex 50, Banco del Atl{mtico 50 
Banamex 
Bancomer 
Bancrecer-Dresdner 
Bital 
Capitaliza 
Confia-Principal 
Garante 
Genesis 
Inbursa 
Previnter 
Profuturo GNP 
Santander Mexicano 
Siglo XXI 
S6lida Banorte 
Tepeyac 
Zurich 
Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival100 
Grupo Financiero Bancomer 51, Aetna Interna-
cional, Inc. 49 
Grupo Financiero Bancrecer 51, Dresdner Pen-
sion Fund Holdings 44, Allianz Mexico, S. A. 5 
Grupo Financiero BITAL 51, ING America Insur-
ance Holding, Inc. 49 
General Electric Capital Assurance Co. 100 
Abaco Grupo Financiero 51, Principal Interna-
tional49 
Grupo Financiero Serfin 51, Grupo Financiero 
Citibank40, Habitat Desarrollo Internacional 9 
Seguros Genesis, S. A. 100 
Grupo Financiero INBURSA 100 
Boston AIG Company 90, The Bank of Nova Sco-
tia 10 
Grupo Nacional Provincial 51, Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya-Mexico, S. A. 25, Provida Internacional, 
S. A. 24 
Grupo Financiero Invermexico 75, Santander In-
vestment, S. A. 25 
Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social 50, IXE 
Grupo Financiero 50 
Grupo Financiero Banorte 
Seguros Tepeyac 
Zurich Vida, Compafiia de Seguros 77, Gabriel 
Monterrubio Guasque 10 
Note: No mention is made of shareholders with equity participation under 5 
percent of the total capital of the respective AFORE 
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Table 4 
Administrative Costs as a Percentage of Expenditure 
Latin America OECD 
Argentina 2.30 Australia 1.22 
Bolivia 21.39 Canada 2.80 
Chile 8.00 France 4.18 
Colombia 81.80 Germany 2.86 
El Salvador 33.40 Italy 2.20 
Mexico 23.55 Japan 1.79 
Peru 130.98 Spain 2.81 
Uruguay 6.51 Switzerland 3.04 
United Kingdom 3.10 
United States 3.28 
Source: Mitchell (1996) 
The cost of administering the new system is high by OECD stan-
dards. When compared with other Latin American countries, however, 
administrative costs are not out of line (Table 4). 
Because charges apply to different parts of the AFORE, it is not 
easy to compare charges across AFOREs. If we examine the system 
as a whole, however, the charges appear too high at this early stage 
of the system's development. In Chile, for example, in 1984 charges 
amounted to 9 percent of wages or 90 percent of contributions to the 
retirement system (Edwards, 1996, p. 17). The costs dropped to about 
15 percent of contributions in 1990 (World Bank, 1994, p. 224). 
3.3 Organization and Investment Activities of AFOREs 
Some AFOREs are fully owned by Mexican companies, while other 
AFOREs are partly owned by foreign companies. For example, AFORE 
Bancomer is 51 percent owned by the second largest banking group in 
Mexico and the other 49 percent is owned by Aetna, one of the largest 
insurance companies in the United States. Garante has the most in-
teresting ownership structure. It has the majority shareholding by a 
Mexican group; it is partly owned by Citibank; and it is partly owned by 
a pension fund from Chile, AFP Habitat. 
On one hand, the Mexican government was keen to have foreign 
companies participate in this sector, because foreign participation usu-
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ally signals a faith in the system. On the other, the government was 
also keen on keeping the majority shareholding within the country for 
political reasons. By the end of 1999, three of the AFOREs have already 
merged with others. Atlantico has been sold to Confia; Genesis has 
been sold to Santander; and Previnter has been sold to Profuturo. 
Although CONSAR is clear on ownership rules, it has been ambigu-
ous on the issue of prevention of monopoly rule. It states: 
CONSAR will establish procedures to prevent absolute or rel-
ative monopolistic practices resulting from the behavior of 
individual market participants or due to market concentra-
tion. In doing so, the CONSAR will abide by the Economic 
Competition Federal Act. Accordingly, no single AFORE may 
have more than 20 percent of the retirement saving system's 
market. Subject to prior authorization from its Consulta-
tive and Surveillance Committee, the CONSAR may authorize 
greater market concentration ratios, as long as this does not 
harm workers' interests. 
The rule initially did not define the phrase "no more than 20 percent 
of the market." Later, CONSAR ruled that it meant 20 percent of the 
total number of individual accounts (rather than 20 percent of market 
share in terms of value). CONSAR also left the question of some AFOREs 
operating with more than 20 percent of all individual accounts open by 
adding the phrase "as long as this does not harm workers' interests." 
At present, AFOREs do not have much freedom in choosing their 
investment portfolios. Basically, all of their investments have to be 
in the form of Mexican government bonds (called CETES) and price-
indexed linked bonds (such as UDIBONOS). 
CETES (Certificados de la Tesoreria de la Federaci6n) are peso-deno-
minated money market instruments issued by the Mexican Treasury in 
28-day, 91-day, 182-day, 364-day, and 728-day maturities. CETES are 
considered to be the short-term interest rate benchmark in Mexico and, 
with rare exceptions, are auctioned on a weekly basis. CETES are similar 
to U.S. Treasury bills. The market for CETES is the most important 
capital market instrument available in Mexico. It is also one of the 
few Mexican capital market instruments with an active futures market: 
CETES futures are traded in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
As a consequence, CONSAR has chosen CETES to be the first instru-
ment for the AFOREs. Because there are CETES of differing maturities, 
it is possible to obtain different rates of return on CETES, as the term 
structure of interest rates does not stay constant over time. 
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Table 5 
Annualized Rates of Return 
(July 1997-June 1999) 
Name Nominal Real 
Banamex 28.83% 8.38% 
Bancomer 29.12% 8.59% 
Bancrecer 25.12% 5.64% 
Bital 29.90% 9.17% 
Garante 29.21% 8.66% 
Genesis 28.29% 7.98% 
Inbursa 25.26% 5.75% 
Principal 27.54% 7.43% 
Profuturo 29.92% 9.19% 
Santander 26.48% 6.64% 
Banorte 28.19% 7.91% 
Tepeyac 26.48% 6.64% 
XXI 27.27% 7.23% 
Zurich 26.79% 6.87% 
Average 28.33% 8.01% 
Source: CONSAR 
About 35 percent of total investment by AFOREs has been in CETES. 
Another 48 percent has been in five-year inflation-indexed government 
bonds called Bonde91, while another 10 percent has been in convertible 
bonds called Udibonos (July 2000). 
Restrictions on the use of financial instruments by the AFOREs have 
reduced the variability in the before-charges rates of return of the funds 
(Table 5). With the restrictions imposed, one important question arises: 
why should different AFOREs charge such high fees? After all, their 
roles have been reduced to (almost) nothing but bookkeeping (Espinosa 
and Sinha, 2000). 
Though there have been high rates of return of the funds, this does 
not automatically imply a high rate of return for workers who have 
money in those funds. The basic problem is the high management fees 
charged by private penSion funds. Shah (1997) has calculated these 
rates of return after charges for Chile (Table 6). Table 6 shows that even 
though the real rates of return of funds have been large and positive 
for the funds, they have not been so for the affiliates. 
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Table 6 
Comparing Real Rates of Return of Funds 
And Cumulative Real Rates of Return of Affiliates in Chile 
Cumulative Rates 
Year Rates For Funds For Affiliates 
1982 28.8% -3.2% 
1983 21.3% -1.3% 
1984 3.5% -5.9% 
1985 13.4% -2.3% 
1986 12.3% 0.3% 
1987 5.4% 0.5% 
1988 6.4% 1.4% 
1989 6.9% 2.1% 
1990 15.5% 4.2% 
1991 29.7% 7.9% 
1992 3.1% 6.9% 
1993 16.2% 8.0% 
1994 18.4% 9.1% 
1995 -2.5% 7.4% 
Source: Shah (1997). Notes: The first column gives the rate of return of the 
fund in a given year. The second column gives the cumulative rate of return. 
Thus, for example. the figure for 1995 for the affiliates is the real rate of return 
the affiliate would have between 1982 and 1995. As a result, it is possible for 
the second column to have a bigger number than the first column. 
The basic features of individual accounts are similar in Mexico. There-
fore, it should not be surprising that the Mexican system will not pro-
duce positive real rates of return in the next decade. 
4 Calculating Future Values of AFORE 
Individual retirement benefits are essentially calculated using an ac-
cumulated value formula. This formula must account for wages, con-
tributions, fees, and discounts. In particular, the following are pecu-
liarities of the Mexican system: 
• The government contribution to the individual account is made 
every two months, and indexing is not applicable monthly. 
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• Commissions come in three basic varieties: 
- Commissions on the flow of funds, 
- Commissions on the account balance, and 
- Commissions on the real rate of return. 
- Some companies charge commissions combining all these op-
tions. 
• In addition, these commissions may vary with the number of years 
one stays in the fund. 
For these reasons, the following discussion will be devoted to a step by 
step development of the formula for calculating retirement benefits. 
4.1 The Basic Formula 
There are two components of the new system: the contribution by 
the worker and the contribution by the government. The contribution 
by the worker is 6.5 percent of his or her base wage. The contribution 
by the government is 5.5 percent of the minimum salary indexed to the 
rate of inflation. There are two additional complications: the interest 
rate is calculated for every account every two months, and indexation 
of the government contribution to inflation occurs every three months. 
For k = 1,2, ... , let Sk denote the accumulated sum in the kth month; 
BWk denote the worker's base wage in the kth month; Gk denote the 
government's contribution in the kth month; ik12) denote the nominal 
annual rate of interest compounded monthly that is in effect in the kth 
month (see, for example, Kellison (1991) for more on nominal interest 
rates); and CP is the number of months of contribution by an affiliate. 
Therefore, we can write the accumulated value in the AFORE as: 
(O.065BWk + Gk) 
ik12 ) 
Sk-l(1 + 12) 
(Sk-l + O.065(BWk-l + BWk) + Gk) 
iF 2) 
x(l + 12) 
Note that, for k = 1,2, ... ,CP, 
k = 1; 
k = 2,4, ... ,CP; (1) 
k = 3,5, ... ,CP. 
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where, CSk is defined as: 
lo.055MW k = 1; rr(4) CSk = CSk-d1 + +) k = 3,5, ... ,CP; CSk-l k=2, 4, ... , CP, (2) 
where rr(4) is the nominal annual adjustment compounded quarterly 
that is in effect in the kth month (every quarter the government's con-
tribution is adjusted according to the consumer price index), and MWk 
is the (national or regional) minimum wage in effect in the kth month. 
The government's contribution is set at 5.5 percent of the minimum 
salary in Mexico City for the year 1997 (about U.S. $1 per day under the 
exchange rate at the end of 1997). 
The idea behind equation (1) is simple. Every affiliate gets his/her 
contribution plus the government's contribution. The way the interest 
is credited and the way the government's contribution is credited makes 
it complicated. The wage (BWk) is added every other month. Govern-
ment contributions are adjusted every three months for inflation. Thus, 
every third month, a bit extra is added using the consumer price index. 
4.2 The Inclusion of Charges 
Equation (1) does not take into account charges that funds impose 
on account holders (affiliates). Some AFOREs have charges on contri-
bution as a percentage of wages (for example, Banamex). Others have 
charges on the balance in the AFORE account (such as Bancrecer). Still 
others have charges on the real interest rate (such as Inbursa). 
Let CWk be the charge on wage (rate) and CBk be the charge on the 
account balance in effect in the kth month. Equation (1) is modified as 
follows: 
k = 1; 
k = 2,4, ... ,CP; (3) 
k = 3, 5, ... , CP; 
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Table 7 
Fee Structure of AFOREs 
As Charges on Annual Flow, Account Balance, and Real Returns 
Charges on 
Annual Flow Account Real Rate 
AFOREs (% of Wages) Balance Of Return 
Atlantico Promex 1.40% 20.00% 
Banamex 0.002% in 1997 
0.85% in Jan. 1998 
1.70% in March 1998 
and onward 
Bancomer 1.70% 
Bancrecer Dresdner 1.60% 0.50% 
Banorte 1.00% 1.50% 
Bital 1.68% 
Capitaliza 1.60% 
Confia Principal 0.90% 1.00% 
Garante 1.68% 
Genesis 1.65% 
Inbursa 33.00% 
Previnter 1.55% 
Profuturo GNP 1.70% 0.50% 
Santander 1.70% 1.00% 
XXI 1.50% 0.99% 
Tepeyac 1.17% 1.00% 
Zurich 0.95% 1.25% 
Source: CONSAR website at http://www.consar.gob.mx 
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There is a third element of charges. For two funds (Inbursa and 
Atlantico) charges apply to the real rate of return. Incorporating the 
charges on the real interest rate yields 
[ 0.065BWk (1 - O~~k5) + Gk J 
x [( 1 + ill~)) (1 _ ~~k ) _ i~l~ CY] 
for k = 1; 
[ 
i\12) ( CBk) i(12) ] Sk-1 (1 + 12) 1 - 12 -12CY 
for k = 2,4, ... ,CP; 
[Sk-l + 0.065(BWk-l + BWk) (1- O~~k5l 
+ Gk] X [(1 + iG)) (1 - ~~k) - ~CY 
for k = 3,5, ... ,CP; 
(4) 
where rr(12) is the annual inflation rate compounded monthly, CY is the 
charge on the real interest rate, and i112 ) is the nonnegative real interest 
rate 
;(12) rr(l2) 
.(12) "1 - } 
tR = max{O, ( rr(12))' 
12 1 + 12 
(5) 
One assumption made here is that the charges remain fixed for the 
total life of the system. In practice, however, the charges for each com-
pany depend on the number of years a person has been in the AFORE. 
For example, AFORE Banamex charges 1.70 percent of wages up to the 
fourth year. A person who stays with the AFORE for the fifth year gets 
a reduction in charges. Thus, the fifth year charge becomes 1.68 per-
cent of wages; the sixth year charge becomes 1.66 percent of wages; 
and so on. This process continues until year 39 with the AFORE with a 
reduction of 0.02 percent of wages for every additional year. 
The final realistic element missing from equation (4) is growth in 
wages. In Chile, for example, the average wage rate has grown at a rate 
of 6 percent per year over the last 20 years. But the rise in the average 
wage rate is not important here, as it represents the average across 
many individuals at a given point of time. For individuals, the more 
meaningful number is the growth of wage rate longitudinally. Hence, 
equation (4) must be modified to take the reductions and wage growth 
into account: 
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(6) 
where fk is the discount rate at month k, and 6.S{6) is the annual growth 
rate of wages, compounded bimonthly, of an individual worker salary 
over his or her lifetime. Note that fk is not the same for all funds. For 
example, AFORE Bancomer offers a rising discount rate starting with 
0.01 percent of wages up to 0.05 percent of wages. 
In some countries (Chile, South Korea), average wage rates have risen 
more than 6 percent in real terms per year. In others (Mexico), the 
average real wage rate has fallen over the past two decades. We should 
look at the wage rate for each individual longitudinally and not the 
average wage for the population. 
Equation (6) is called the comprehensive model and will be used in 
the simulation study of the Mexican fee structure. 
5 Simulation of the Comprehensive Model 
5.1 Simulation Assumptions 
As the simulation is based on equation (6), assumptions must be 
made about many items, including the rates of return for an AFORE. 
Separate assumptions must be made about the rate of inflation and the 
real rate of return because two of the 17 AFOREs have charges based on 
the real rate of return (Inbursa and Atlantico). The growth of individual 
wages rate and the specific charges that apply also must be considered 
in our list of assumptions. 
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Assumptions About Inflation and Wage Growth: The inflation rate is 
assumed to be constant,1 and the real growth rate is assumed to 
be zero over the lifetime of the affiliates. 
Assumptions Abo'.!t Interest: It is a daunting task to predict inflation 
and interest rates for a country that has seen triple digit inflation 
rates and negative real interest rates over a number of years in 
the last 20 years; see Figure 1.2 
Figure 1 
Annualized Inflation Rates in Mexico (1970-1999), Annualized 
Rates of Return for Mexican Government Bonds (CETES) 
(1978-1999), and Mexican Real Interest Rates (1978-1999) 
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1 The author experimented with stochastic inflation rates that have truncated normal 
and uniform distributions. For each 1,000 simulations, the majority of the cases pro-
duced results that were either identical or similar to the ones ·reported with constant 
inflation. 
2Few forecasters are brave enough to predict Mexican rates more than three years. 
Even the Central Bank of MexiCO is reluctant to venture into such an exercise! 
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The simulations are performed under three sets of interest rate 
scenarios: fixed interest rate, stochastic but time-independent 
interest rates, and stochastic and time-dependent interest rate. 
The fixed interest rate scenario is used to provide a benchmark 
to measure our results. A study of month-to-month changes in 
the (nominal) interest rate shows that they are a dependent time 
series process. There is clear evidence of first order autocorrela-
tion.3 Therefore, the first order autoregressive time series model 
is used for interest: 
Xt = 0.7Xt-l + 0.015 + Et 
where Et is normally distributed with mean zero and variance (T2. 
Under this assumption, the long-term interest rate converges to 5 
(0.015/(1- 0.7)) percent. 
Assumptions About Charges: In Mexico commissions often are expres-
sed as a percentage of wages and not as a percentage of contri-
butions. Thus, if a person earns 1,000 pesos a month, the ac-
tual contribution will be 6.5 percent of 1,000 pesos or 65 pesos. 
Hence, the charges in some cases will be a straight percentage 
of the 65 pesos. Of the 17 AFOREs, 15 charge on the flow of 
wages. Eight of the AFOREs charge only on the wages and noth-
ing else. These companies, therefore, do not have schemes based 
on performance of the funds. Regardless of the performance of 
the fund, charges apply. It is easy to compare across those funds: 
we simply choose the fund with the lowest charges. In this case, 
the winner is Previnter with 23.85 percent of contributions. By 
international standards, however, even Previnter's rate is high. In 
addition, there are service fees, some of which are expressed in pe-
sos, and some of which are expressed in UDIs (these are inflation-
indexed rates). Table 8 shows the discount factors obtained by 
staying with the same fund. Table 9 shows the various charges 
levied by each AFORE. 
3See Sinha, T. and Escoto, Y. "Oil Price and Economic Growth: A View from the South." 
Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Annual Conference, November 
17-19,2001 
26 journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 9, 2007 
Table 8 
Partial list of Discounts 
Given by Various AFOREs 
Year Banamex Bital Confia Bancrecer 
1 1.70 1.68 0.90 1.60 
2 1.70 1.68 0.85 1.60 
3 1.70 1.68 0.80 1.60 
4 1.70 1.68 0.75 1.60 
5 1.70 1.68 0.70 1.60 
6 1.68 1.66 0.65 1.58 
7 1.66 1.64 0.60 1.56 
8 1.64 1.62 0.55 1.54 
9 1.62 1.60 0.50 1.52 
10 1.60 1.58 0.45 1.50 
11 1.58 1.58 0.45 1.48 
12 1.56 1.58 0.45 1.46 
13 1.54 1.58 0.45 1.44 
14 1.52 1.58 0.45 1.42 
15 1.50 1.58 0.45 1.40 
16 1.48 1.58 0.45 1.38 
17 1.46 1.58 0.45 1.36 
18 1.44 1.58 0.45 1.34 
19 1.42 1.58 0.45 1.32 
20 1.40 1.58 0.45 1.30 
21 1.38 1.58 0.45 1.28 
22 1.36 1.58 0.45 1.26 
23 1.34 1.58 0.45 1.24 
24 1.32 1.58 0.45 1.22 
25 1.30 1.58 0.45 1.20 
26 1.28 1.58 0.45 1.18 
27 1.26 1.58 0.45 1.16 
28 1.24 1.58 0.45 1.14 
29 1.22 1.58 0.45 1.12 
30 1.20 1.58 0.45 1.10 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Partial list of Discounts 
Given by Various AFOREs 
Year Banamex Bital Confia Bancrecer 
31 1.18 1.58 0.45 1.08 
32 1.16 1.58 0.45 1.06 
33 1.14 1.58 0.45 1.04 
34 1.12 1.58 0.45 1.02 
35 1.10 1.58 0.45 1.00 
36 1.08 1.58 0.45 0.98 
37 1.06 1.58 0.45 0.96 
38 1.04 1.58 0.45 0.94 
39 1.02 1.58 0.45 0.92 
40 1.00 1.58 0.45 0.90 
41 0.98 1.58 0.45 0.88 
42 0.96 1.58 0.45 0.86 
43 0.94 1.58 0.45 0.84 
44 0.92 1.58 0.45 0.82 
45 0.90 1.58 0.45 0.80 
46 0.88 1.58 0.45 0.78 
47 0.86 1.58 0.45 0.76 
48 0.84 1.58 0.45 0.74 
49 0.82 1.58 0.45 0.72 
50 0.80 1.58 0.45 0.70 
51 0.78 1.58 0.45 0.68 
52 0.76 1.58 0.45 0.66 • 
53 0.74 1.58 0.45 0.64 
54 0.72 1.58 0.45 0.62 
55 0.70 1.58 0.45 0.60 
56 0.68 1.58 0.45 0.58 
57 0.66 1.58 0.45 0.56 
58 0.64 1.58 0.45 0.54 
59 0.62 1.58 0.45 0.52 
60 0.60 1.58 0.45 0.50 
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Table 9 
Commissions as Percentages of Contribution 
Commissions as a Charges as a 
AFORE Percentage of Wage Percentage of Contributions 
Banamex 1.70% 26.15% 
Bancomer 1.70% 26.15% 
Profuturo 1. 70% plus others 26.15% plus others 
Santander 1. 70% plus others 26.15% plus others 
Bital 1.68% 25.85% 
Garante 1.68% 25.85% 
Genesis 1.65% 25.38% 
Previnter 1.55% 23.85% 
XXI 1.50% plus others 23.08% plus others 
Capitaliza 1.50% 23.08% 
Atlantico 1.40% 21.54% 
Tepeyac 1.17% plus others 18.00% plus others 
Banorte 1.00% plus others 15.38% plus others 
Zurich 0.95% 14.62% 
Confia 0.90% plus others 13.85% plus others 
Bancrecer Charges on balance Charges on balance 
Inbursa Charges on real return Charges on real return 
Source: CONSAR website at <http://www. consar . gob. mx> 
5.2 Results of the Simulations 
Though the simulations are performed under various scenarios with 
fixed interest rates, stochastic but independent interest rates, and stoch-
astic-dependent independent interest rates, only the results of the the 
deterministic case are presented here. 
For most income levels, Inbursa performs the best at the beginning 
because Inbursa's charges are based only on account balances, and bal-
ances are usually small in the early stages. Funds that charge on con-
tributions only have the opposite trend: their charges appear relatively 
high when the balance is low (compared with the contributed amount). 
Three factors determine how the balance grows: (1) the real interest 
rate, (2) the level of income, and (3) the inflation rate. 
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• Impact of real interest rate: If the real interest rate is high and 
stays high (for example, more than 6 percent), the charges of In-
bursa become significant within five to ten years. If the real in-
terest rate is low (3 percent or less), Inbursa remains the top per-
former for 20 years. 
• Impact of income level: If the income level rises, the cost benefits 
from staying with Inbursa rise. For example, for persons earning 
the minimum wage, the benefits of low fees from Inbursa evap-
orate after ten years. But, for people earning at least ten times 
the minimum wage, the benefits (such as lower management fees) 
from staying with Inbursa are evident for 20 years. 
• Impact of inflation rate: Except for Inbursa, all other funds charge 
a fee regardless of how well the funds are performing. (Atlantico's 
charges are based on the real rate and the contribution.) There-
fore, if the real rate is zero or negative, Inbursa will not charge 
anything, while other funds will still charge a fee. 
The simulation results show that no single fund dOminates all others 
under all scenarios. Our results do, however, suggest an interesting 
strategy: it is optimal to switch to a different fund after ten to 20 years 
(depending on level of income). The best fund to shift to depends the 
person's level of income and the level of real interest rates. 
We do not show each fund's accumulated values under each sce-
nario because the actual accumulated values are scenario dependent. 
Instead, the overall ranking of each fund is reported to see if any fund 
dominates. Clearly the rankings do not tell us how far apart the funds 
are in their final balances, nor do they tell us how accumulated values 
compare with a fund with zero fees. After 25 years or so, the differences 
between consecutively ranked funds are in the order of magnitude of 1 
to 3 percent. 
Tables 10, 11, and 12 show the best performing AFOREs for various 
levels of interest, inflation, and salaries. For example, Panel A of Table 
10 shows that Inbursa is the best performing fund when the nominal 
interest rate is 3 percent and inflation is 0 percent and a person with 
income equivalent to the minimum salary leaves his or her money in the 
AFORE for five years. For investments for five, ten, and 15 years, Inbursa 
is the best performer. The best AFORE with 0 percent inflation is Zurich, 
but Banamex leads in other scenarios. A 3 percent real rate is used in 
Table 10 because the Mexican government's national development plan 
projects a long-term real rate of 3 percent in Mexico. 
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Table 10 
Different Scenarios with a 3% Real Interest Rate and a Minimum Salary of 768.5 
Panel A: Initial Wage = Minimum Salary 
Nominal Time (in years) 
Rates Inflation 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
3% 0% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich Zurich Zurich 
Confia Confia Zurich Zurich Banamex Banamex Banamex '-0 
Bancrecer Zurich Confia Banamex Inbursa Previnter Previnter l::: .... 
~ 
9% 6% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex ~ 
0 
Confia Confia Banamex Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter -... l> 
Capitaliza Capitaliza C"'\ Bancrecer Banamex Previnter Inbursa Zurich .... l::: 
~ 
15% 12% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex .... ~ 
Confia Banamex Banamex Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter 'i:J 
Zurich Confia Previnter Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza ~ C"'\ 
.... 
21% 18% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex ;::;" ~ 
Confia Banamex Banamex Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter ~ 
Zurich Previnter Previnter Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza ~ 
I\.J 
<::> 
<::> 
V) 
~. 
:s-
Sl 
Table 10 (continued) ):. ~ 
Different ScenariOS with a 3% Real Interest Rate and a Minimum Salary of 768.5 Sl 
-~ 
Panel B: Initial Wage = 10 x Minimum Salary ~. 
I.S:l 
Nominal Time (in years) :s: 
Sl 
Rates Inflation 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 ~ Sl 
I.S:l 
3% 0% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich ~ ~ 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Inbursa ~ ~ 
.... 
Confia Confia Confia Zurich Zurich Bancrecer Banamex ~ 
~ 
9% 6% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich 
""' Cl 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Zurich Zurich Banamex -.... ""\) 
Confia Confia Confia Bancrecer Inbursa 
~. 
Bancrecer Banamex ~ 
.... 
15% 12% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich Zurich ~ 
""\) 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Zurich Inbursa Banamex ~ ~ 
""' Confia Confia Zurich Bancrecer Banamex Banamex Previnter c· ~ 
21% 18% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich Zurich .." s:: 
~ 
Bancrecer Confia Zurich Zurich Zurich Inbursa Banamex Sl.. 
""' Confia Bancrecer Confia Banamex Banamex Banamex PreVinter 
w 
"""' 
W 
N 
Table 10 (continued) 
Different Scenarios with a 3% Real Interest Rate and a Minimum Salary of 768.5 
Panel C: Initial Wage = 100 x Minimum Salary 
Nominal Time (in years) 
Rates Inflation 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
3% 0% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Zurich '-0 
Confia Confia Confia Zurich Zurich Bancrecer Bancrecer s.:: ..... 
~ 
9% 6% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich ~ 
0 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Zurich Inbursa -... ~ 
Confia Confia Confia Zurich 
r, 
Bancrecer Banamex Banamex ..... s.:: 
~ 
15% 12% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich ..... §: 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Zurich Zurich Inbursa '1::J 
..... 
Confia Confia Confia Bancrecer Banamex Banamex Banamex ~ r, 
..... 
21% 18% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich ;:;;" ~ 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Zurich Zurich Inbursa ~ 
:--
Confia Confia Zurich Bancrecer Banamex Banamex Banamex 
.:0 
I'v 
0 
0 
V) 3;. 
::s-
Table 11 ~ 
P 
Different Scenarios with a 6% Real Interest Rate and a Minimum Salary of 768.5 :::s !O:l 
Panel A: Initial Wage = Minimum Salary ~ 3;. 
l.!O:l 
Nominal Time (in years) ~ 
!O:l 
Rates Inflation 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 :::s !O:l 
l.!O:l 
6% 0% Inbursa Inbursa Zurich Zurich Zurich Zurich Banamex ~ :s 
~ 
Confia Confia Previnter Banamex Banamex Banamex Zurich :::s ..... 
Bancrecer Zurich Banamex Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter ~ ~ 
V> 
12% 6% Inbursa Inbursa Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex a ~ 
"\J 
Confia Confia Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter =:!. ;§ 
Bancrecer Banamex Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza ..... ~ 
"\J 
18% 12% Inbursa Inbursa Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex ~ Banamex :::s 
V> 
Confia Banamex Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter o· :::s 
Zurich Previnter Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza Capitaliza ~ :::s 
s:::.. 
24% 18% Inbursa Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex V> 
Confia Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter 
w 
w 
w 
""" Table 11 (continued) 
Different Scenarios with a 6% Real Interest Rate and a Minimum Salary of 768.5 
Panel B: Initial Wage = 10 x Minimum Salary 
Nominal Time (in years) 
Rates Inflation 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
6% 0% Inbursa Inbursa Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Zurich Zurich 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Inbursa Zurich Bancrecer Bancrecer Banamex 
'-0 
Confia Confia Confia Confia Confia Banamex Previnter s::: 
"'" ::s
12% 6% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich Zurich Zurich Zurich ~ 
0 
-.... 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Banamex Banamex Banamex ):. 
r"\ 
... 
Confia Confia Confia Confia Previnter Previnter Previnter s::: s::. 
"'" 18% 12% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich Zurich Zurich Zurich ~ 
"\:J 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Banamex Banamex Banamex Banamex 
"'" s::. r"\ 
... 
Confia Confia Bancrecer Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter ri' 
.(\:) 
24% 18% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich Zurich Zurich Banamex ~ 
Bancrecer Confia Zurich Banamex Banamex Banamex Zurich 
.1.0 
Confia Bancrecer Confia Previnter Previnter Previnter Previnter I\J 0 
0 
V) 
:sO 
Table 11 (continued) ::s-~ 
Different Scenarios with a 6% Real Interest Rate and a Minimum Salary of 768.5 ::t:. ~ 
!O:) 
Panel C: Initial Wage = 100 x Minimum Salary ~ 
Nominal Time (in years) :sO It) 
Rates Inflation 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 ~ !O:) ~ 
!O:) 
6% 0% Inbursa Inbursa Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Zurich Zurich It) (\) 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Inbursa Zurich Bancrecer Bancrecer Banamex ~ (\) ~ 
.... 
Confia Confia Confia Confia Confia Banamex Previnter ~ 
(\) 
12% 6% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Bancrecer Zurich Zurich Zurich '"" 0 
-.... 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Zurich Bancrecer Banamex Banamex \:J ~. 
Confia Confia Confia Confia Banamex Previnter Previnter ~ 
.... (\) 
18% 12% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich Zurich Zurich Zurich ~ 
~ 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Banamex Banamex Banamex '"" o· 
~ 
Confia Confia Confia Inbursa Previnter Previnter Previnter ~ 
~ 
24% 18% Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Zurich Zurich Zurich Zurich !i::l... 
'"" 
Bancrecer Bancrecer Bancrecer Inbursa Banamex Banamex Banamex 
Confia Confia Zurich Banamex Previnter Previnter Previnter 
w 
Vl 
w 
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Table 12 
Different Scenarios with a 9% Real Interest Rate and a Minimum Salary of 768.5 
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Not surprisingly, the rankings change when the scenarios change. 
Once again, Inbursa does well for short time periods such as five or ten 
years. Banamex is better for all the long horizon scenarios. For money 
invested in an AFOREs for ten years when there is a 6 percent nominal 
interest rate and 0 percent inflation rate, for example, Confia comes out 
at the top, followed by Zurich and Banamex. 
If the real interest rate stays high (9 percent) for a number of years, 
the advantage of Inbursa erodes. There is no single winning AFORE 
under all possible alternatives. 
6 Alternatives to the Decentralized Pension Model 
The Chilean-influenced model adopted by Mexico is not the only 
model available. Other models have been tried successfully in different 
countries. The two most cited alternatives are the Singaporean Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) model and the employer-based Australian-Swiss 
model. 
6.1 The Singaporean Central Provident Fund 
As the name suggests, the CPF model has only one fund. This fund 
is centralized and controlled by the government. Investment by the CPF 
has been mainly in foreign government bonds and some foreign stocks. 
The real rate of return for the fund has been less than 3 percent per 
year over a period of 25 years. The transactions cost has been low as 
well. 
To implement the Singaporean model, people have to have faith in 
government. In Mexico (and in other parts of Latin America), the pop-
ulation has had little faith in government. In the past governments in 
these countries have not been efficient or open. Therefore, implement-
ing a model with a central and crucial role for the government was not 
a viable option. 
There have been criticisms of the Singapore model. Two compar-
isons can be made: one with other private pension funds operating in 
Singapore and the other with holding a mostly-bonds fund. On both 
counts, CPF account holders are penalized 1 to 3 percent per annum 
(Valdes-Prieto, 1998). 
40 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 9, 2001 
6.2 The Australian-Swiss Employer Based Model 
In the Australian-Swiss model each employer (rather than each em-
ployee) chooses a fund. Every employee for the employer is assigned 
the same fund. In this case, the transactions cost is low. Funds do 
not have to seek each account holder. They can concentrate on a few 
thousand employers rather than on millions of employees. Therefore, 
the costs of obtaining additional accounts are significantly lower. In 
these systems of pension, there is some choice by the superannuation 
account holders. Each pension fund is floated as a separate entity. In 
each entity employees (mostly through the unions) choose half of the 
members of the board of directors, and the employer chooses the rest. 
Hence, it is possible for workers to have (at least) indirect influence 
on the fund. From the complaints received by the Commissioner of 
Superannuation in Australia, it seems that many persons are deeply 
dissatisfied with the lack of choice. As a result, new legislation is being 
considered that would force each superannuation fund to offer a menu 
of at least five separate funds for employees. 
Early evidence on management fees in Australia indicates that costs 
are low. A recent study conducted by the Association of Superfunds 
of Australia reveals that earlier estimates may have severely underes-
timated management fees. This study, reported by Quinlivan (1998), 
argues that the pension fund industry in Australia has approximately 
$350 billion under management (Australian dollars). Cost of adminis-
tration and management is estimated at $4 billion. The annual inflow is 
around $33 billion. Therefore, charges are 12 percent of annual inflow 
and 1.15 percent of account balance. These charges in Australia are not 
spectacularly lower than what we observe in Latin America. The results 
from Murthi et al., (1999) for the United Kingdom are similar. The cost 
of fund management (without including fees for changing funds) is of 
the same order of magnitude in the United Kingdom. 
7 Closing Comments 
In studying the Mexican model, we compare the performance of the 
AFORE funds under various economic scenarios. The results show that 
an optimal strategy for individuals who want to minimize the impact 
of Mexico's high management fees is to switch funds periodically. The 
point of switching depends on assumptions about the scenarios. More-
over, in some scenarios, the optimal strategy is to switch more than 
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once. Still, the effect of these fees is to reduce workers' retirement 
funds by as much as 30 percent. 
In contrast, Mitchell (1999) conducts a set of simulations with a per-
son earning average income and without the discount given to persons 
with long tenure in one fund. Mitchell (page 16) wrongly concludes that 
" ... Plan ranking by commissions prove rather stable across simulated 
holding periods and interest rates." 
As other countries contemplate privatization of their public pen-
sion systems they must be wary because privatization is a double edged 
sword. First, privatization brings the risk of adverse selection that is 
well known in the insurance literature. Second, privatization does not 
solve the problem of transition generation, the obligations of the gov-
ernment to pay the promised benefits under the old pay-as-you-go sys-
tem. If the government issues bonds to finance the transition, then 
the system is not privatized (Espinosa and Sinha, 2000). Third, if pri-
vatization entails huge transaction costs, then another (perhaps more 
insidious) problem may have been created. 
There are generally two circumstances under which high transac-
tions cost or low rates of return credited to workers' funds may be 
obscured: (i) during periods of rapidly growing wages, or (ii) during 
periods of rapidly growing contribution rates. 
In Chile, high transactions costs were obscured by the rapidly grow-
ing wage rate. In addition, the real rates of return on the funds were 
high. Therefore, account holders ignored costs because the growth in 
their fund balances was high. 
In Singapore the real wage rate grew rapidly in the late 1980s while 
the rate of contributions grew rapidly (from 11 percent of salary to 45 
percent of salary) over a period of 25 years. Yet during the same period 
low rates of return were credited on the workers' accounts. Account 
holders did not protest because their balances grew steadily. 
In closing, we must emphasize that differences exist among the 
funds and using calculated average fees tend to mask these differences. 
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